Zepto (Kiranakart Technologies Private Limited)
Zepto operates an online quick commerce marketplace platform providing 10-minute doorstep delivery of groceries, fresh foods, and daily essentials.
At a Glance
What The Company Does
Zepto is a leading quick commerce platform in India that offers 10-minute delivery of groceries, fresh foods, and daily essentials. It operates through a dense network of local dark stores (1,139 stores as of March 31, 2026) and offers B2B trading, last-mile logistics, and platform advertising services to merchant partners and brands.
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 |
What does the company do, in one plain sentence?
Where to find: Cover, 'Our Business', Industry Overview
Why it matters: If you can't say it simply, neither can the company - and that's telling.
Benchmark: Unexplainable model = step back
|
Zepto operates an online quick commerce marketplace platform providing 10-minute doorstep delivery of groceries, fresh produce, and daily essentials. |
OK | Our Business, p.232 |
| 2 |
Operating history & year of incorporation
Where to find: 'History and Corporate Matters'
Why it matters: A long, consistent track record beats a recently assembled roll-up.
Benchmark: <3 yrs real operating history = caution
|
Originally incorporated as Kiranakart Technologies Private Limited on Dec 5, 2020 (commenced operations in Dec 2020). Changed name to Zepto Private Limited on Apr 16, 2025, and converted to public company Zepto Limited on Dec 8, 2025. |
OK | History and Corporate Matters, p.283 |
| 3 |
Industry / sub-sector & position in the value chain
Where to find: 'Industry Overview'
Why it matters: Defines the correct peer set and the normal margin/return profile.
Benchmark: -
|
Quick Commerce (e-retail). Operates as a downstream aggregator and marketplace platform connecting B2B suppliers, local dark store operators, delivery partners, and retail end-consumers. |
OK | Industry Overview, p.189 |
| 4 |
Stated competitive strengths - real or generic?
Where to find: 'Our Strengths'
Why it matters: 'Experienced promoters, quality focus' is boilerplate; specifics are real moats.
Benchmark: Only generic strengths = weak moat
|
Strengths include: (1) Densification flywheel reducing delivery distances and times; (2) Data flywheel enhancing product assortment/availability through micro-market trends; (3) Operational excellence (in-house WMS/tech, Lean/Six Sigma). |
OK | Our Business, p.251-253 |
| 5 |
Stated growth strategy - concrete or aspirational?
Where to find: 'Our Strategies'
Why it matters: Fundable, specific plans beat vague ambition.
Benchmark: Vague strategy = discount the story
|
Strategies include: (1) Rapid growth of order volume/user base/NRV while optimizing Cost per Order (via densification and dark store efficiency); (2) Everyday Low Price (EDLP) platform philosophy to drive user retention; (3) Margin expansion via ad revenue and new categories. |
OK | Our Business, p.263-267 |
| 6 |
Industry tailwinds vs headwinds
Where to find: 'Industry Overview', MD&A
Why it matters: Structural growth vs a flat/declining or cyclical-peak market.
Benchmark: Declining/flat industry = headwind
|
Tailwinds: Rapid expansion of Indian quick commerce (projected to grow 5-7x between CY25 and CY30 to reach ₹5.1-7.1 trillion); rising digital payments and smartphone penetration. Headwinds: Intensifying competition from new and existing players. |
OK | Industry Overview, p.193, 202 |
| 7 |
Who commissioned the industry report?
Where to find: 'Industry Overview' footnotes
Why it matters: Company-paid reports (e.g. CRISIL/F&S) skew optimistic - discount accordingly.
Benchmark: Always company-commissioned
|
The report titled 'India's Quick-Commerce Industry: Market Structure and Growth Drivers' (dated May 30, 2026) was prepared by Redseer Strategy Consultants Private Limited, which was commissioned and paid for by Zepto Limited. |
Watch | Industry Overview, p.189 |
| 8 |
Is the TAM / market-size claim credible?
Where to find: 'Industry Overview'
Why it matters: Sanity-check the addressable market against the company's actual revenue.
Benchmark: Implausibly large TAM = puffery
|
TAM claim: Indian retail market valued at ~₹91 trillion in CY25, quick commerce GMV at ~₹963 billion (CY25). Quick commerce projected to grow to ₹5.1-7.1 trillion by CY30. Claims are credible given low current penetration (~1%). |
OK | Industry Overview, p.190, 198 |
| 9 |
Market share and its trend
Where to find: Industry / Business
Why it matters: Share gains signal real competitiveness; losses signal pressure.
Benchmark: Losing share = flag
|
Zepto is described as the fastest-growing quick commerce platform in terms of orders placed, with a 119.5% order volume CAGR over FY24-FY26. It has achieved the highest increase in share of total orders among scaled peers (GMV >$1B). |
OK | Industry Overview, p.215-216 |
| 10 |
Key competitors named
Where to find: 'Competition', Basis for Offer Price
Why it matters: Tells you the genuine peer set for the valuation comparison later.
Benchmark: -
|
Key listed and unlisted competitors are Blinkit (operated by peer Eternal Limited) and Instamart (operated by peer Swiggy Limited). New competitors include Amazon Now and Flipkart Minutes. |
OK | Industry Overview, p.215 |
The IPO Itself
Zepto is raising Rs 8,010.00 cr through a fresh issue of shares, alongside an OFS of up to 113,466,566 shares by selling shareholders. Only PE and institutional investors (like Nexus Ventures and Kaiser Foundation) are selling; the promoters are not selling. The fresh proceeds are growth-oriented, earmarked for setting up 1,904 new dark stores (Rs 1,628.98 cr), technology (Rs 1,324.78 cr), marketing (Rs 520.00 cr), and lease rentals of existing stores (Rs 1,734.94 cr).
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 |
Mainboard or SME issue?
Where to find: Cover page
Why it matters: SME = thinner disclosure, lower liquidity, higher risk.
Benchmark: SME = extra caution
|
Mainboard issue (listed on BSE and NSE). |
OK | Cover page |
| 12 |
Total issue size (Rs cr)
Where to find: Cover page / 'The Offer'
Why it matters: Basic sizing of the raise.
Benchmark: -
|
Fresh issue of ₹8,010.00 cr (₹80,100 million) and an Offer for Sale (OFS) of up to 113,466,566 equity shares. Total issue size in ₹ is not finalized as the price band is represented as [●]. |
OK | The Offer, p.64 |
| 13 |
Fresh issue amount (Rs cr)
Where to find: 'The Offer'
Why it matters: Only the fresh issue brings new money into the company.
Benchmark: -
|
₹8,010.00 cr (₹80,100 million) fresh issue. |
OK | The Offer, p.64 |
| 14 |
OFS amount (Rs cr)
Where to find: 'The Offer'
Why it matters: OFS proceeds go to selling shareholders, not the business.
Benchmark: -
|
OFS of up to 113,466,566 equity shares. Value in ₹ is represented as [●] as the price band is not yet determined. |
OK | The Offer, p.64 |
| 15 |
Fresh : OFS ratio
Where to find: 'The Offer'
Why it matters: A heavy OFS tilt means the IPO is mostly an exit.
Benchmark: OFS >70% + tiny fresh = flag
|
Fresh issue of ₹8,010.00 cr vs OFS of 113,466,566 shares. Split in ₹ is represented as [●] due to price band not being determined, but it is heavily tilted towards Fresh Issue. |
OK | The Offer, p.64 |
| 16 |
Who is selling in the OFS?
Where to find: 'The Offer' / Selling Shareholders
Why it matters: Promoter exit and PE exit carry very different signals.
Benchmark: Large promoter sell-down = flag
|
Selling shareholders are: Nexus Ventures VI Holdings LLC (57.36M shares), Nexus Ventures VII Holdings LLC (30.40M shares), Contrary ZEP Holdings LLC (7.80M shares), Razor Ventures Zepto LLC (9.36M shares), Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (4.39M shares), and Kaiser Permanente Group Trust (4.16M shares). No promoters are selling. |
OK | The Offer, p.65 |
| 17 |
How much does the COMPANY actually receive?
Where to find: Fresh issue minus issue expenses
Why it matters: This is the real fuel for growth - often far less than the headline.
Benchmark: -
|
The company receives the Fresh Issue proceeds of ₹8,010.00 cr (₹80,100 million) minus Fresh Issue expenses. Net proceeds are represented as [●] in the DRHP as the price band and expenses are not finalized. |
OK | Objects of the Offer, p.143 |
| 18 |
Objects: capex - amount & specificity
Where to find: 'Objects of the Offer'
Why it matters: Specific, costed capex is genuine growth spending.
Benchmark: Vague/uncosted capex = flag
|
₹1,628.98 cr (₹16,289.75 million) for expansion of the dark store network by setting up 1,904 new dark stores. Average capex is detailed from FY27 to FY30: ₹7.94M to ₹9.06M per store. |
OK | Objects of the Offer, p.144, 147 |
| 19 |
Objects: debt repayment amount
Where to find: 'Objects of the Offer'
Why it matters: Deleveraging is healthy but it is balance-sheet repair, not growth.
Benchmark: High % to debt = repair, not growth
|
₹0.00 cr (Nil). The company has zero outstanding borrowings in FY26, so no proceeds are allocated to debt repayment. |
OK | Objects of the Offer, p.144 |
| 20 |
Objects: working capital amount
Where to find: 'Objects of the Offer'
Why it matters: Normal for a growing WC-intensive business; large amounts can signal a stretched cycle.
Benchmark: -
|
₹0.00 cr (Nil) allocated directly as working capital in the specific objects, but working capital needs are funded through GCP. |
OK | Objects of the Offer, p.144 |
| 21 |
Objects: acquisition - named target or 'future M&A'?
Where to find: 'Objects of the Offer'
Why it matters: A named, costed target beats a blank cheque for 'inorganic growth'.
Benchmark: Unspecified M&A = flag
|
Funding inorganic growth through 'unidentified acquisitions' and general corporate purposes (GCP) combined. Capped at 35% of gross proceeds. Unidentified acquisitions alone are capped at 10% of gross proceeds (₹801.00 cr). No target is named. |
Watch | Objects of the Offer, p.143-144 |
| 22 |
General Corporate Purposes (GCP) as % of fresh issue
Where to find: 'Objects of the Offer'
Why it matters: SEBI caps GCP (and unidentified objects). High GCP = undefined use of your money.
Benchmark: Maxed-out / high GCP = flag
|
GCP is capped at 25% of gross proceeds (₹2,002.50 cr or ₹20,025 million). The remaining unallocated proceeds (₹2,801.30 cr or 34.97% of fresh issue) will go towards GCP and Inorganic Growth combined. |
Watch | Objects of the Offer, p.144 |
| 23 |
Issue expenses as % of the issue
Where to find: 'Objects of the Offer'
Why it matters: Fees eat into the proceeds that reach the company.
Benchmark: Unusually high = flag
|
Represented as [●] in the DRHP, as the price band and expenses are not finalized. |
OK | Objects of the Offer, p.143 |
| 24 |
Overall read: growth / debt-repair / exit / mixed?
Where to find: Synthesise the objects
Why it matters: The single most important interpretation of the whole issue.
Benchmark: Pure exit or repair = low enthusiasm
|
Growth-heavy: 43.1% of fresh issue goes directly to new dark store setup and technology/marketing (growth), while the remaining goes to lease rentals of existing stores (opex) and GCP/Inorganic growth (mixed). No debt repayment or promoter exit. |
OK | Objects of the Offer, p.144 |
| 25 |
Pre-IPO placement done - at what price vs the IPO band?
Where to find: 'Capital Structure'
Why it matters: A recent placement far below the IPO price signals aggressive pricing.
Benchmark: Big gap below IPO price = flag
|
The company may consider a Pre-IPO Placement of up to ₹1,602.00 cr (20% of fresh issue) prior to RHP. Primary CCPS issuances in Oct/Nov 2025 were allotted at ₹37.74 per share (adjusted). |
OK | Capital Structure, p.93, 180 |
| 26 |
WACA - weighted avg cost of acquisition of promoter/investor shares vs IPO price
Where to find: 'Basis for Offer Price'
Why it matters: SEBI-mandated. Shows the markup at which insiders are selling to you.
Benchmark: IPO price >> WACA = priced for insiders
|
WACA of primary issuances in the last 18 months is ₹37.74 per share. The IPO price band is represented as [●], so the markup cannot be determined yet. |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.180-181 |
Business Quality
Analysis of customer and supplier concentration, recurring revenue moats, capacity utilisation, and pricing power.
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 27 |
Revenue breakdown by segment / product
Where to find: 'Our Business', financials
Why it matters: Reveals mix and hidden concentration.
Benchmark: -
|
FY26 Revenue breakdown: (1) Sale of traded goods: ₹17,587.92 cr (77.7% of revenue); (2) Service revenue: ₹5,022.52 cr (22.2%), which includes Warehousing/last-mile charges (₹2,779.84 cr), Advertisements (₹1,635.73 cr), and Platform services (₹564.17 cr). |
OK | Notes to Restated Financials, Note 18, p.377 |
| 28 |
Top customer as % of revenue
Where to find: 'Our Business', Risk Factors
Why it matters: Single-customer dependency is a major fragility.
Benchmark: Top-1 >25-30% = flag
|
Virtually 0% (negligible). Serving millions of retail end-consumers on an order-by-order basis. |
OK | Notes to Restated Financials, Note 18, p.377 |
| 29 |
Top 5 customers as % of revenue
Where to find: 'Our Business', Risk Factors
Why it matters: Customer concentration risk.
Benchmark: Top-5 >50% = flag
|
Virtually 0% (negligible). No single customer or small group represents a material share of retail revenue. |
OK | Notes to Restated Financials, Note 18, p.377 |
| 30 |
Are customer relationships recurring/contracted or order-by-order?
Where to find: 'Our Business'
Why it matters: Recurring revenue is higher quality and more predictable.
Benchmark: Purely transactional = lower quality
|
D2C retail relationships are order-by-order (transactional), supported by the 'Zepto Pass' loyalty program. B2B agreements are in place with platform licensees and merchant partners. |
OK | Notes to Restated Financials, Note 18, p.377 |
| 31 |
Recurring / repeat revenue %
Where to find: 'Our Business', MD&A
Why it matters: Predictability of the top line.
Benchmark: -
|
Not explicitly disclosed as a percentage of revenue in the DRHP, but cohort retention data shows 45-50% transacting user retention after 12 quarters. |
OK | Our Business, p.265 |
| 32 |
Supplier concentration (top / top-5)
Where to find: 'Our Business', Risk Factors
Why it matters: Input dependency and weak bargaining power.
Benchmark: High concentration = flag
|
Not disclosed in terms of exact percentages in the DRHP. The company uses non-exclusive contracts (typically 2-year term) for private labels to mitigate risk. |
OK | Risk Factors, p.52 |
| 33 |
Single-source or single raw-material dependency?
Where to find: Risk Factors
Why it matters: Exposure to a supply or price shock.
Benchmark: Single source = flag
|
No single-source raw material dependency as the company operates a marketplace with a wide assortment of daily essentials sourced from multiple suppliers. |
OK | Risk Factors, p.52 |
| 34 |
Manufacturing footprint - single-plant dependency?
Where to find: 'Our Business', Properties
Why it matters: One plant concentrates operational and disaster risk.
Benchmark: Single critical plant = flag
|
N/A. The company does not own manufacturing facilities (operates as a marketplace/logistics player), but depends on third-party contract manufacturers for private label products. |
OK | Risk Factors, p.37, 52 |
| 35 |
Current capacity utilisation
Where to find: 'Our Business'
Why it matters: Capex objects only make sense if existing capacity is already running hot.
Benchmark: Low utilisation + big capex = question
|
N/A for manufacturing. However, dark store efficiency is tracked: throughput per dark store grew from 1,325 OPD in FY24 to 1,677 OPD in FY26 (and 2,140 OPD in Q4 FY26). |
OK | Objects of the Offer, p.146 |
| 36 |
Geographic concentration of revenue
Where to find: 'Our Business'
Why it matters: Dependence on one region or country.
Benchmark: One geography dominant = flag
|
100% of revenue is within India. Operations are concentrated in high-density urban areas/metro cities (Mumbai, Bengaluru, Delhi NCR, Hyderabad, Chennai, Pune, Kolkata), representing geographic concentration. |
Watch | Notes to Restated Financials, Note 18, p.377 |
| 37 |
Asset-heavy or asset-light?
Where to find: Balance sheet, fixed assets
Why it matters: Shapes return on capital and future funding needs.
Benchmark: -
|
Asset-light on real estate (dark stores are leased, represented by ₹2,506.21 cr in ROU assets in FY26) but requires fit-out capex (₹881.45 cr in Net PPE in FY26). |
OK | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Assets and Liabilities, p.71 |
| 38 |
Working-capital intensity
Where to find: Balance sheet
Why it matters: High intensity traps cash as the business grows.
Benchmark: Rising WC/sales = flag
|
Negative working capital cycle: Cash Conversion Cycle was -16.46 days in FY26 (-2.52 days in FY25, -21.55 days in FY24) due to stretching payables (73.55 payable days) relative to debtor collection (39.10 days) and inventory (17.99 days). |
OK | Restated Financials, p.71-72 |
| 39 |
Distribution model (direct / dealer / online)
Where to find: 'Our Business'
Why it matters: Trade-off between control, margin and reach.
Benchmark: -
|
Online direct-to-consumer (D2C) delivery model via mobile application/website, supported by a network of dark stores. |
OK | Our Business, p.232 |
| 40 |
Order book / backlog (if relevant)
Where to find: 'Our Business', MD&A
Why it matters: Forward revenue visibility.
Benchmark: Shrinking backlog = flag
|
N/A. Retail e-commerce does not maintain an order book/backlog. |
N/A | Our Business, p.232 |
| 41 |
Cyclicality of the business
Where to find: Industry, MD&A
Why it matters: How durable are earnings through a downturn?
Benchmark: Highly cyclical at a peak = flag
|
Low cyclicality. Groceries and daily essentials are non-discretionary, defensive products, though demand spikes during festivals. |
OK | Our Business, p.232 |
| 42 |
Entry barriers / moat - real or weak?
Where to find: Strengths, Competition
Why it matters: Whether good returns can be sustained.
Benchmark: Low barriers = flag
|
Moat is moderate: scale, network density, last-mile efficiency, and brand. However, entry barriers are low as new players (Amazon Now, Flipkart Minutes) are entering, making it highly competitive. |
Watch | Our Business, p.251, 255 |
| 43 |
Key licences / regulatory approvals the business depends on
Where to find: Risk Factors, Govt approvals
Why it matters: Licence loss can be existential.
Benchmark: Critical pending approvals = flag
|
FSSAI food business licenses, trade licenses, shops & establishment registrations. Disclosed risk of pending approvals/renewals. |
OK | Risk Factors, p.36, 51 |
| 44 |
Technology / obsolescence risk
Where to find: Risk Factors
Why it matters: Exposure to disruption.
Benchmark: -
|
High dependency on proprietary technology (WMS, routing engine, app). Technology disruptions represent operational risks. |
Watch | Risk Factors, p.49, 57 |
Are The Numbers Real?
Zepto's numbers show hyper-growth, but it is not backed by cash generation. Operating cash flow (CFO) has been negative in all three years (FY26: -Rs 3,462.44 cr, FY25: -Rs 4,624.83 cr, FY24: -Rs 1,097.88 cr). The cash conversion cycle is negative (-16.46 days in FY26) because the company stretches its suppliers (73.55 payable days) to fund collections (39.10 debtor days) and inventory (17.99 inventory days). EBITDA margins improved from -41.3% in FY25 to -23.2% in FY26 but remain deeply negative.
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 |
Revenue (3 yrs) and CAGR
Where to find: Restated Financial Statements
Why it matters: The headline growth rate.
Benchmark: -
|
Revenue: FY24 ₹4,454.52 cr → FY25 ₹11,109.95 cr → FY26 ₹22,623.58 cr. CAGR: 125.4%.
|
OK | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Profit and Loss, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 46 |
Is growth organic or acquisition-driven?
Where to find: MD&A
Why it matters: Acquired growth is lower quality and harder to sustain.
Benchmark: Mostly inorganic = flag
|
Organic. The company has no history of inorganic acquisitions. |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.154 | ||||||||||
| 47 |
Gross margin trend (3 yrs)
Where to find: Financials
Why it matters: Pricing power and ability to pass on input costs.
Benchmark: Falling gross margin = flag
|
Gross Margin: FY24 21.6% → FY25 14.1% → FY26 19.6%. Margins fell in FY25 due to rapid store expansion but recovered in FY26.
|
OK | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 48 |
EBITDA and EBITDA-margin trend
Where to find: Financials
Why it matters: Core operating profitability.
Benchmark: -
|
Operating EBITDA: FY24 -₹1,118.82 cr (-25.1% margin) → FY25 -₹4,589.34 cr (-41.3%) → FY26 -₹5,244.12 cr (-23.2%). EBITDA losses increased in absolute terms but improved in margin terms in FY26.
|
Watch | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 49 |
Sudden margin spike right before the IPO?
Where to find: Compare FY-2 / FY-1 / latest
Why it matters: A classic window-dressing pattern.
Benchmark: Sharp pre-IPO jump = flag
|
No sudden spike, but EBITDA margin improved from -41.3% in FY25 to -23.2% in FY26. It remains deeply negative. |
OK | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 50 |
PAT and PAT-margin trend
Where to find: Financials
Why it matters: The bottom line and its direction.
Benchmark: -
|
PAT: FY24 -₹1,214.79 cr (-27.3% margin) → FY25 -₹4,699.71 cr (-42.3%) → FY26 -₹5,905.19 cr (-26.1%). PAT losses increased in absolute terms but improved in margin terms in FY26.
|
Watch | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 51 |
Other income as % of PAT
Where to find: P&L and notes
Why it matters: Tests whether profit is operating or propped up by 'other income'.
Benchmark: High other-income share = flag
|
Other Income: FY26 ₹504.79 cr (equivalent to -8.5% of PAT loss of -₹5,905.19 cr). Propped up by interest income on bank deposits and mutual fund gains. |
Watch | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 52 |
CFO (operating cash flow) trend
Where to find: Cash flow statement
Why it matters: The cash reality behind reported profit.
Benchmark: -
|
CFO: FY24 -₹1,097.88 cr → FY25 -₹4,624.83 cr → FY26 -₹3,462.44 cr. Cash outflows decreased in FY26 due to improved working capital management, but remain deeply negative.
|
Flag | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Cash Flows, p.334 | ||||||||||
| 53 |
CFO / PAT (cash conversion), multi-year
Where to find: CFO divided by PAT
Why it matters: THE single best earnings-quality test.
Benchmark: Consistently <0.6-0.7 = flag
|
CFO/PAT: FY24 0.90x → FY25 0.98x → FY26 0.59x. Ratios are based on negative CFO and negative PAT, showing that operating cash loss is less than accounting loss.
|
Watch | Restated Financials, p.75, 334 | ||||||||||
| 54 |
Was CFO negative in any year?
Where to find: Cash flow statement
Why it matters: Operations consuming rather than generating cash.
Benchmark: Any negative CFO year = flag
|
Yes, CFO was negative in all three years (FY26: -₹3,462.44 cr, FY25: -₹4,624.83 cr, FY24: -₹1,097.88 cr).
|
Flag | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Cash Flows, p.334 | ||||||||||
| 55 |
Free cash flow (CFO minus capex)
Where to find: Cash flow statement
Why it matters: Ability to self-fund growth.
Benchmark: Persistently negative FCF = caution
|
FCF: FY24 -₹1,220.54 cr → FY25 -₹5,505.95 cr → FY26 -₹4,131.50 cr. FCF is deeply negative in all three years due to operating cash losses and ongoing dark store fit-out capex.
|
Flag | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Cash Flows, p.334 | ||||||||||
| 56 |
Total debt and net debt
Where to find: Balance sheet
Why it matters: Absolute leverage.
Benchmark: -
|
Borrowings are 0 in FY26 and FY25 (₹171.61 cr in FY24). Lease liabilities are ₹2,710.10 cr in FY26 (₹2,187.85 cr in FY25, ₹342.11 cr in FY24). Net Debt is negative if cash/investments (₹5,680.53 cr in FY26) are considered. |
OK | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Assets and Liabilities, p.71-72 | ||||||||||
| 57 |
Debt / Equity
Where to find: Balance sheet
Why it matters: Balance-sheet risk (judge vs industry).
Benchmark: Non-financial >1.5-2x = flag (context)
|
Debt/Equity: 0.00x based on borrowings (excluding lease liabilities). If lease liabilities are included: 27,101.00 / 59,978.87 = 0.45x in FY26. |
OK | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Assets and Liabilities, p.71-72 | ||||||||||
| 58 |
Interest coverage (EBIT / interest)
Where to find: P&L
Why it matters: Ability to service debt comfortably.
Benchmark: <2-3x = flag
|
Interest Coverage: -23.18x in FY26 (-36.26x in FY25, -21.79x in FY24). Negative due to EBIT losses (EBIT is -₹6,138.37 cr in FY26). |
Flag | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 59 |
ROE and trend
Where to find: Compute / ratios
Why it matters: Return generated on shareholders' funds.
Benchmark: Low or falling = flag
|
ROE: FY24 -70.7% → FY25 -54.7% → FY26 -98.5%. Negative due to persistent net losses.
|
Flag | Restated Financials, p.71, 75 | ||||||||||
| 60 |
ROCE and trend
Where to find: Compute / ratios
Why it matters: Efficiency of all capital employed.
Benchmark: -
|
ROCE: FY24 -65.6% → FY25 -58.2% → FY26 -102.3%. Negative due to operating losses. (With lease liabilities: FY24 -55.6%, FY25 -46.4%, FY26 -70.5%).
|
Flag | Restated Financials, p.71, 72, 75 | ||||||||||
| 61 |
ROCE vs cost of capital
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Is the business creating or destroying value?
Benchmark: ROCE below ~12-14% = value-destructive
|
ROCE is deeply negative (FY26: -102.34%), well below any positive cost of capital, indicating value destruction due to high operating losses. |
Flag | Restated Financials, p.71, 72, 75 | ||||||||||
| 62 |
Debtor (receivable) days and trend
Where to find: Compute from BS & P&L
Why it matters: Collection quality; rising days can hide channel-stuffing.
Benchmark: Sharply rising = flag
|
Debtor Days: FY24 26.52 days → FY25 58.84 days → FY26 39.10 days. Debtor days rose in FY25 but improved in FY26.
|
OK | Restated Financials, p.71, 75 | ||||||||||
| 63 |
Inventory days and trend
Where to find: Compute
Why it matters: Demand mismatch or obsolescence risk.
Benchmark: Sharply rising = flag
|
Inventory Days (COGS): FY24 13.22 days → FY25 23.35 days → FY26 17.99 days. Inventory days rose in FY25 but improved in FY26.
|
OK | Restated Financials, p.71, 75 | ||||||||||
| 64 |
Payable days and trend
Where to find: Compute
Why it matters: Supplier financing; abnormal stretching can mask stress.
Benchmark: Abnormal stretch = caution
|
Payable Days (Purchases): FY24 61.30 days → FY25 84.71 days → FY26 73.55 days. Suppliers are stretched to fund the working capital cycle.
|
Watch | Restated Financials, p.71, 75 | ||||||||||
| 65 |
Cash conversion cycle
Where to find: Debtor + inventory - payable days
Why it matters: Overall working-capital health.
Benchmark: Lengthening sharply = flag
|
Cash Conversion Cycle: FY24 -21.55 days → FY25 -2.52 days → FY26 -16.46 days. Negative cycle is typical for quick commerce but rose to near-zero in FY25 before improving in FY26.
|
OK | Restated Financials, p.71, 72, 75 | ||||||||||
| 66 |
Contingent liabilities vs net worth
Where to find: 'Contingent Liabilities' note
Why it matters: Off-balance-sheet exposure that can hit equity.
Benchmark: Large vs net worth = flag
|
Contingent Liabilities: ₹2.01 cr (₹20.10 million) as of March 31, 2026. This represents only 0.03% of Net Worth (₹5,997.89 cr), which is negligible. |
OK | Summary of Contingent Liabilities, p.80 | ||||||||||
| 67 |
Capex history vs proposed capex
Where to find: Cash flow vs Objects
Why it matters: Execution credibility of the expansion plan.
Benchmark: Proposed >> historical = execution risk
|
Proposed fit-out capex: ₹1,628.98 cr (FY27-FY30) for 1,904 new stores. Historical capex (PPE purchase): FY24 ₹122.66 cr → FY25 ₹881.12 cr → FY26 ₹669.06 cr. Proposed capex is significantly higher, representing execution risk.
|
Watch | Objects of the Offer, p.144 | Cash Flows, p.334 | ||||||||||
| 68 |
Dividend history
Where to find: Financials
Why it matters: Signal of capital discipline (interpret in context).
Benchmark: -
|
No dividends declared or paid in the last three Fiscals or subsequent period. |
OK | Dividend Policy, p.319 | ||||||||||
| 69 |
Standalone vs consolidated divergence
Where to find: Both statement sets
Why it matters: Where the profits - and losses - actually sit.
Benchmark: Big divergence = investigate
|
The company has only presented Restated Consolidated Financial Information in the DRHP (no Standalone financials are disclosed). |
N/A | Restated Consolidated Financial Information, p.320 | ||||||||||
| 70 |
Material restatement adjustments?
Where to find: Restated Financial Statements
Why it matters: Prior-period corrections that change the trend.
Benchmark: Material restatements = flag
|
No material restatement adjustments were made to the audited financials other than adjustments to give effect to the common control business combination (amalgamation of Kiranakart Pte. Ltd.). |
OK | Statement of Restatement Adjustments, Annexure VII, p.393 | ||||||||||
| 71 |
Auditor qualifications / emphasis of matter
Where to find: Auditor's report
Why it matters: The auditor's own stated doubts.
Benchmark: Any qualification = flag
|
Qualified opinion on internal controls (IFCoFR) for FY25 and FY26 due to lack of appropriate IT general controls (access and change management). Modifications on books of account regarding audit trail (edit log) features on certain software. |
Flag | Auditor's Report, p.326-327 | ||||||||||
| 72 |
Aggressive revenue-recognition policy?
Where to find: Significant accounting policies
Why it matters: Timing games that inflate current profit.
Benchmark: Aggressive recognition = flag
|
Standard policy: Revenue recognized upon delivery of goods and satisfaction of performance obligations. Adheres to Ind AS 115. No aggressive revenue recognition practices identified. |
OK | Material Accounting Policies, Note 1.2, p.373 |
Governance & Related Parties
Promoters hold 18.47% pre-IPO on a fully diluted basis, and none of their shares are pledged. However, KMP remuneration is high in absolute terms (Ramesh Bafna was paid Rs 3.85 cr in FY26). S.R. Batliboi & Associates LLP qualified their report on internal controls (IFCoFR) due to access and change control issues in IT systems. Related-party transactions include significant intercompany loans to operational subsidiaries, though non-eliminated RPTs are negligible.
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 73 |
Promoter background and track record
Where to find: 'Our Promoters', 'Management'
Why it matters: The quality and integrity of stewardship.
Benchmark: Prior failure/fraud = flag
|
Promoters Aadit Palicha (Managing Director & CEO, age 23) and Kaivalya Vohra (WTD, age 23) are co-founders with a strong track record of hyper-scaling Zepto, though they have limited experience in other listed companies. |
OK | Our Promoters and Promoter Group, p.313 |
| 74 |
Promoter holding pre-IPO
Where to find: 'Capital Structure'
Why it matters: Skin in the game today.
Benchmark: -
|
Promoters hold 2,327,948,161 equity shares representing 18.47% of pre-IPO paid-up capital on a fully diluted basis. |
OK | Our Promoters and Promoter Group, p.313 |
| 75 |
Promoter holding post-IPO
Where to find: 'Capital Structure'
Why it matters: Alignment going forward.
Benchmark: Very low post-IPO = misalignment
|
Promoters are not selling in the OFS, so post-IPO share count remains exactly 2,327,948,161. Post-IPO holding % is represented as [●]% as the price band is not finalized. |
OK | Capital Structure, p.94 | Our Promoters, p.313 |
| 76 |
Promoter share pledge
Where to find: 'Capital Structure', Risk Factors
Why it matters: Pledging signals financial stress.
Benchmark: Any meaningful pledge = flag
|
None of the equity shares held by the promoters are subject to any pledge or encumbrance. |
OK | Capital Structure, p.132 |
| 77 |
Promoter / KMP remuneration vs PAT and peers
Where to find: 'Management'
Why it matters: Cash extraction relative to profits.
Benchmark: High pay vs PAT = flag
|
FY26 Remuneration: Aadit Palicha ₹2.74 cr, Kaivalya Vohra ₹2.61 cr, Ramesh Bafna ₹3.85 cr. Remuneration is high in absolute terms but small relative to the net loss of ₹5,905.19 cr. |
Watch | Management, p.300 | RPT Note, p.375 |
| 78 |
Group structure - complex / circular / many entities?
Where to find: 'Our Group Companies'
Why it matters: Complexity is where value and leakage hide.
Benchmark: Complex web = flag
|
No group companies. The company has a simple structure with only operational subsidiaries (Zepto Marketplace Private Limited, Zavrix Realty, etc.), though intercompany loans are substantial. |
OK | Related Party Transactions, p.375-377 |
| 79 |
Auditor - reputable? Recent change or resignation?
Where to find: 'Auditors', history
Why it matters: Audit credibility and any pre-IPO churn.
Benchmark: Resignation before IPO = flag
|
Statutory auditors are S.R. Batliboi & Associates LLP (EY network, reputable Big 4 firm), appointed on March 9, 2024. Former auditor Ruthala & Co. resigned due to preoccupation on March 7, 2024. |
OK | General Information, p.87 |
| 80 |
CFO / KMP churn before the IPO
Where to find: 'Management', history
Why it matters: Instability in key finance roles before listing.
Benchmark: CFO exit pre-IPO = flag
|
Statutory CFO Ramesh Bafna has been in office since May 15, 2023 (stable). Company Secretary Megha Hegde resigned after 2 months in Oct 2024, replaced by Samad Shariff in Dec 2024. |
OK | Management, p.296-297 |
| 81 |
Board: proportion of independent directors
Where to find: 'Management'
Why it matters: Strength of independent oversight.
Benchmark: Below norms = flag
|
The Board has 6 directors, including 2 Independent Directors (33.3%). Paul Hudson is the Non-Executive Nominee Director and Chairman, so this complies with SEBI LODR requirements. |
OK | Management, p.296, 302 |
| 82 |
Independent-director credentials - real or token?
Where to find: Director bios
Why it matters: Whether oversight is actually effective.
Benchmark: Token / related IDs = flag
|
Independent director credentials are strong: Akhil Gupta (former Vice Chairman of Bharti Enterprises/Airtel, 70 years old) and Anulakshmi Hariharan (resides in San Francisco, on the board of Rappi Inc. and Avis Car System, 46 years old). |
OK | Management, p.296, 298 |
| 83 |
ESOP / outstanding options - dilution overhang
Where to find: 'Capital Structure'
Why it matters: Future dilution of your stake.
Benchmark: Large unvested pool = caution
|
Outstanding options in force under ESOP 2025 are 1,212,276,973 options, representing 9.62% of pre-offer fully diluted shares. The total ESOP pool is 1,475,434,008 options (~11.71%). Exercise price is ₹0. This represents a significant dilution overhang. |
Watch | Capital Structure, p.139 |
| 84 |
Lock-in: promoter and anchor / pre-IPO investors
Where to find: 'Capital Structure'
Why it matters: Share supply that hits the market post-listing.
Benchmark: Big near-term unlocks = caution
|
Promoters' minimum contribution of 20% locked in for 3 years (or 18 months); all other pre-issue shares (~80% of company) locked in for 1 year from listing. Represents a large potential supply overhang after 1 year. |
Watch | Capital Structure, p.94 |
| 85 |
Past corporate-governance issues / regulatory strictures
Where to find: Risk Factors, Litigation
Why it matters: A pattern of past behaviour.
Benchmark: Any history = flag
|
No past corporate-governance issues or regulatory strictures against promoters. However, active regulatory investigations exist (ED summons requesting information for promoters/directors Aadit Palicha and Kaivalya Vohra). |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.589 |
Related Party Transactions (Extraction Risk)
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 86 |
Sales to related parties (% of revenue)
Where to find: RPT note
Why it matters: Revenue propped up by group entities?
Benchmark: High % = flag
|
No sales to related parties in the consolidated statements (except intercompany transactions of ₹189.73 cr to subsidiary ZMPL which are eliminated on consolidation). |
OK | Related Party Disclosures, Note 30, p.375 |
| 87 |
Purchases from related parties (% of costs)
Where to find: RPT note
Why it matters: A channel to manipulate margins.
Benchmark: High % = flag
|
Negligible. Modulus Hospitality Services LLP (relative has significant influence) provided services of ₹3.93 million (0.00% of costs) in FY25 and ₹0 in FY26. |
OK | Related Party Disclosures, Note 30, p.375 |
| 88 |
Loans / advances to promoter or related entities
Where to find: RPT note
Why it matters: Company cash diverted to insiders.
Benchmark: Any sizeable loan out = flag
|
No loans/advances to promoters or other non-eliminated RPs. Loans were only given to operational subsidiaries: Kiranakart Wholesale (receivable ₹8.49 cr in FY25, ₹0 in FY26) and ESOP Trust (₹471.27 cr in FY26). All intercompany loans are eliminated on consolidation. |
OK | Related Party Disclosures, Note 30, p.376 |
| 89 |
Rent / royalty / brand fees paid to related parties
Where to find: RPT note
Why it matters: Recurring cash extraction from the company.
Benchmark: Royalty to promoter = flag
|
Nil (no royalty or brand fees paid to promoters or other related parties, only standard intercompany chargebacks which are eliminated). |
OK | Related Party Disclosures, Note 30, p.375 |
| 90 |
Outstanding RPT balances (receivable / payable)
Where to find: RPT note
Why it matters: Money stuck with related parties.
Benchmark: Large outstanding = flag
|
Negligible outstanding balances with non-eliminated RPs (Salary payable to Aadit Palicha: ₹0.72 cr, Kaivalya Vohra: ₹0.66 cr in FY26). Intercompany outstanding balances (eliminated) are large: ZMPL receivable ₹492.92 cr in FY26. |
OK | Related Party Disclosures, Note 30, p.376 |
| 91 |
RPT trend over 3 years
Where to find: RPT note
Why it matters: Rising reliance on related-party dealings.
Benchmark: Increasing trend = flag
|
Transactions with non-eliminated RPs decreased (Modulus Hospitality services fell from ₹3.93 million in FY25 to ₹0 in FY26). Intercompany RPTs (eliminated) increased to support operational growth. |
OK | Related Party Disclosures, Note 30, p.375-376 |
| 92 |
Disclosed at arm's length? Pricing basis?
Where to find: RPT note
Why it matters: Whether terms are fair to minority shareholders.
Benchmark: 'At cost'/unclear basis = scrutinise
|
Yes, transactions are disclosed as conducted on an arm's length basis and in the ordinary course of business. |
OK | Related Party Disclosures, Note 30, p.375 |
| 93 |
Overall RPT concern level (Low / Medium / High)
Where to find: Synthesise this layer
Why it matters: Your single judgment on related-party risk.
Benchmark: -
|
Low. No major non-arm's length leakages or loans to promoters. Intercompany funding is high but standard to support subsidiaries. |
OK | Related Party Disclosures, Note 30, p.375-376 |
Litigation & Regulatory
Quantification of pending criminal, civil, and direct/indirect tax litigations against the company, its promoters, and subsidiaries measured against net worth and annual profitability.
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 94 |
Criminal cases against promoters / directors
Where to find: 'Outstanding Litigation'
Why it matters: An integrity red flag that can override the numbers.
Benchmark: Any = serious flag
|
One criminal complaint under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 filed by labor inspector against promoter Kaivalya Vohra regarding record-keeping lapses at Karnataka hub. Summoms issued; High Court of Karnataka has stayed the proceedings. Pending. |
Flag | Outstanding Litigation, p.586, 587 |
| 95 |
Material civil / commercial cases - company
Where to find: 'Outstanding Litigation'
Why it matters: Direct business and financial risk.
Benchmark: -
|
Nil (no outstanding civil or commercial litigation exceeding the materiality threshold of ₹102.22 million). |
OK | Outstanding Litigation, p.581 |
| 96 |
Direct + indirect tax disputes and amounts
Where to find: 'Outstanding Litigation'
Why it matters: Contingent cash outflows.
Benchmark: Large vs PAT = flag
|
Direct Tax disputes: 8 cases involving ₹46.10 cr (₹460.95 million); Indirect Tax disputes: 11 cases involving ₹55.80 cr (₹557.95 million) for Company and 6 cases involving ₹0.33 cr (₹3.26 million) for Subsidiaries. Total tax claims = ₹102.22 cr. |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.590 |
| 97 |
Regulatory / statutory actions (SEBI, RBI, environmental, labour)
Where to find: 'Outstanding Litigation'
Why it matters: Signals compliance culture.
Benchmark: Active actions = flag
|
Yes, CCPA penalty of ₹0.70 million (₹7 lakh) for dark patterns ('Basket Sneaking' & 'Drip Pricing') against ZMPL (appealed, stayed by NCDRC). Summoms from ED to promoters Aadit Palicha and Kaivalya Vohra requesting information. Food safety cases in Meerut/Pune. |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.582, 588, 590 |
| 98 |
Total quantifiable amount involved
Where to find: Litigation summary
Why it matters: Sizing the aggregate exposure.
Benchmark: -
|
Total quantifiable amount involved in litigation is ₹102.30 cr (₹102.22 cr tax claims + ₹0.08 cr regulatory penalties). |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.582, 590 |
| 99 |
Materiality vs PAT and net worth
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Whether the exposure is survivable.
Benchmark: Multiple of PAT / net worth = flag
|
Total quantifiable litigation (₹102.30 cr) is 1.7% of the FY26 net worth of ₹5,997.89 cr and represents 1.73% of the FY26 loss of ₹5,905.19 cr. |
OK | Outstanding Litigation, p.590 |
| 100 |
Any case threatening a key licence or the business model?
Where to find: Litigation, Risk Factors
Why it matters: Existential risk to operations.
Benchmark: Yes = serious flag
|
CCPA dark patterns order directed Zepto to ensure discontinuation of dark patterns and conduct regular self-audits. This impacts user retention tactics but does not threaten key licenses. |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.588 |
Valuation
Zepto's IPO price and multiples are not yet determined. However, peer comparison shows Zomato (Eternal) trading at a P/E of 635.05x (consolidated), with Swiggy trading at a loss (P/E NA). Zepto's pre-IPO WACA of Series H CCPS in late 2025 was Rs 37.74 per share (adjusted). Public investors should compare the final IPO price band against this WACA to assess the markup being charged.
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 101 |
IPO P/E (post-issue, upper band)
Where to find: Basis for Offer Price / compute
Why it matters: The headline earnings multiple you're paying.
Benchmark: -
|
Not determined as the price band is represented as [●] in the DRHP. |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.158 |
| 102 |
Peer P/E - and is the peer set fair or cherry-picked?
Where to find: 'Basis for Offer Price'
Why it matters: Companies pick flattering peers; rebuild the set yourself.
Benchmark: Cherry-picked rich peers = flag
|
Peer set: Swiggy Limited (Diluted EPS ₹-16.87, P/E NA due to losses) and Eternal Limited (Zomato) (Diluted EPS ₹0.39, P/E 635.05). Peer set is fair as they represent the only other scaled quick commerce players in India. |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 |
| 103 |
EV / EBITDA vs peers
Where to find: Compute / peers
Why it matters: A capital-structure-neutral comparison.
Benchmark: -
|
EV/EBITDA is not calculable for Zepto due to price band represented as [●] and negative EBITDA (₹-5,244.12 cr in FY26). Peers: Swiggy Instamart EBITDA is negative (₹-858.00 cr); Zomato Blinkit is EBITDA positive (₹37.00 cr). |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 | Benchmarking, p.171, 174 |
| 104 |
Price / Sales (especially if loss-making)
Where to find: Compute
Why it matters: The relevant lens for unprofitable companies.
Benchmark: Aggressive P/S on losses = flag
|
Not calculable for Zepto as price band is represented as [●]. Peer Zomato (Eternal) has Price/Sales of ~12.2x and Swiggy of ~6.3x (based on closing market price on May 25, 2026). |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 |
| 105 |
Price / Book
Where to find: Compute
Why it matters: Relevant for asset-heavy and financial businesses.
Benchmark: -
|
Not calculable for Zepto as price band is represented as [●]. Peer Zomato (Eternal) has Price/Book of ~14.6x and Swiggy of ~4.1x (based on closing price on May 25, 2026). |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 |
| 106 |
Implied market cap at IPO
Where to find: Compute
Why it matters: The absolute size of what you're buying.
Benchmark: -
|
Not determined as the price band is represented as [●] in the DRHP. Based on pre-offer share count of 12,603,195,213, it will be: (12,603,195,213 + Fresh Issue shares) * IPO price. |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.158 |
| 107 |
ROE vs peers
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Does quality justify any premium?
Benchmark: Premium + lower ROE = flag
|
Zepto ROE is -98.5% in FY26. Peers: Swiggy consolidated ROE is -22.7% (due to net loss of ₹2,636 cr); Zomato (Eternal) consolidated ROE is +1.18% (due to net profit of ₹351 cr). Zepto's ROE is significantly lower. |
Flag | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 |
| 108 |
ROCE vs peers
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Capital efficiency relative to price.
Benchmark: -
|
Zepto ROCE is -102.3% in FY26. Peer Zomato (Eternal) ROCE is positive (~1.2% consolidated); Swiggy ROCE is negative. Zepto's ROCE is significantly lower than Zomato's but comparable to Swiggy's. |
Flag | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 |
| 109 |
Growth vs peers
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Does faster growth justify the premium?
Benchmark: Premium + slower growth = flag
|
Zepto Revenue growth is 125.4% CAGR over FY24-FY26 (Revenue grew 103.6% in FY26 to ₹22,623.58 cr). Peer Swiggy grew by ~26% in FY26 (consolidated) and Zomato by ~45% (consolidated). Zepto is growing significantly faster. |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 |
| 110 |
Margins vs peers
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Quality of earnings relative to price.
Benchmark: -
|
Zepto gross margin is 19.6% and EBITDA margin is -23.2% in FY26. Peer Zomato (Eternal) gross margin is ~21% and EBITDA margin ~1.5% (consolidated). Swiggy gross margin is ~18% and EBITDA margin ~-8% (consolidated). |
Watch | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 |
| 111 |
IPO price vs WACA / pre-IPO placement (the markup)
Where to find: Basis for Offer Price
Why it matters: What insiders paid versus what you're paying.
Benchmark: Large multiple over WACA = flag
|
WACA of primary issuances in the last 18 months is ₹37.74 per share. The IPO price is represented as [●], so the exact markup cannot be computed yet. |
OK | Basis for Offer Price, p.180-181 |
| 112 |
Is the premium justified by ROCE / ROE / growth / margins?
Where to find: Synthesise
Why it matters: The core valuation verdict.
Benchmark: Premium unsupported by quality = flag
|
The premium over WACA cannot be computed yet. However, the premium over asset value (NAV ₹2.95) is likely high, which is justified by Zepto's faster growth (125.4% CAGR) but offset by negative ROCE/ROE and losses. |
Watch | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 |
| 113 |
What growth does the price implicitly assume?
Where to find: Reverse the multiple / judgment
Why it matters: Are the embedded expectations realistic?
Benchmark: Heroic assumptions = flag
|
Consensus assumptions require Zepto to maintain a revenue growth of >50% and achieve EBITDA breakeven within 18-24 months post-IPO to justify a multi-billion dollar valuation. |
Watch | Basis for Offer Price, p.158 |
In The Company's Own Words
Material risk disclosures extracted directly from the Risk Factors section of the RHP document, highlighting internal and external threats admitted by management.
"(1) History of losses (₹5,905.19 cr in FY26) and negative CFO; (2) Failure to retain/acquire users cost-effectively; (3) Dependency on acquiring/retaining partners; (4) Delivery partner retention/labor risks; (5) Dark store expansion and leasing risks."
"Yes, active regulatory investigations (ED summons to promoters Aadit Palicha and Kaivalya Vohra requesting information); CCPA dark patterns investigation and ₹0.70 million penalty; and minimum wage criminal complaint against Kaivalya Vohra."
"Quantified risks are primarily litigations and theft: ₹102.22 cr tax claims, ₹0.07 cr CCPA penalty, ₹0.01 cr food safety penalty, and ~₹0.22 cr in theft cases. No specific revenue-impact percentage is quantified."
"Going concern note in Annexure V lists losses of ₹5,905.19 cr in FY26 but notes that net current assets are positive at ₹4,330.75 cr and additional equity capital has been raised. No going-concern qualification from auditors."
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 114 |
Top 5 risk factors the company itself lists
Where to find: 'Risk Factors'
Why it matters: Management's own stated worries - read them first.
Benchmark: -
|
(1) History of losses (₹5,905.19 cr in FY26) and negative CFO; (2) Failure to retain/acquire users cost-effectively; (3) Dependency on acquiring/retaining partners; (4) Delivery partner retention/labor risks; (5) Dark store expansion and leasing risks. |
OK | Risk Factors, p.23-33 |
| 115 |
Any genuine dealbreaker buried in boilerplate?
Where to find: 'Risk Factors'
Why it matters: The serious risks hide among generic ones; find them.
Benchmark: -
|
Yes, active regulatory investigations (ED summons to promoters Aadit Palicha and Kaivalya Vohra requesting information); CCPA dark patterns investigation and ₹0.70 million penalty; and minimum wage criminal complaint against Kaivalya Vohra. |
Flag | Outstanding Litigation, p.586, 588, 590 |
| 116 |
Quantified risks (e.g. 'X would cut revenue by Y%')
Where to find: 'Risk Factors'
Why it matters: The risks management bothered to quantify are usually the real ones.
Benchmark: -
|
Quantified risks are primarily litigations and theft: ₹102.22 cr tax claims, ₹0.07 cr CCPA penalty, ₹0.01 cr food safety penalty, and ~₹0.22 cr in theft cases. No specific revenue-impact percentage is quantified. |
OK | Outstanding Litigation, p.582, 590 |
| 117 |
Going-concern or liquidity language anywhere?
Where to find: Risk Factors / Auditor
Why it matters: A direct signal of survival risk.
Benchmark: Any going-concern language = serious flag
|
Going concern note in Annexure V lists losses of ₹5,905.19 cr in FY26 but notes that net current assets are positive at ₹4,330.75 cr and additional equity capital has been raised. No going-concern qualification from auditors. |
Watch | Notes to Restated Financials, Note 1.2, p.338 |
Red-Flag Dashboard
Layer-by-Layer Risk Distribution (117 Checkpoints)
Flags & Watch-outs Roll-Up (36 checkpoints requiring monitoring)
| # | Checkpoint | Finding | Status | Page Ref | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 |
Who commissioned the industry report?
Where to find: 'Industry Overview' footnotes
Why it matters: Company-paid reports (e.g. CRISIL/F&S) skew optimistic - discount accordingly.
Benchmark: Always company-commissioned
|
The report titled 'India's Quick-Commerce Industry: Market Structure and Growth Drivers' (dated May 30, 2026) was prepared by Redseer Strategy Consultants Private Limited, which was commissioned and paid for by Zepto Limited. |
Watch | Industry Overview, p.189 | ||||||||||
| 21 |
Objects: acquisition - named target or 'future M&A'?
Where to find: 'Objects of the Offer'
Why it matters: A named, costed target beats a blank cheque for 'inorganic growth'.
Benchmark: Unspecified M&A = flag
|
Funding inorganic growth through 'unidentified acquisitions' and general corporate purposes (GCP) combined. Capped at 35% of gross proceeds. Unidentified acquisitions alone are capped at 10% of gross proceeds (₹801.00 cr). No target is named. |
Watch | Objects of the Offer, p.143-144 | ||||||||||
| 22 |
General Corporate Purposes (GCP) as % of fresh issue
Where to find: 'Objects of the Offer'
Why it matters: SEBI caps GCP (and unidentified objects). High GCP = undefined use of your money.
Benchmark: Maxed-out / high GCP = flag
|
GCP is capped at 25% of gross proceeds (₹2,002.50 cr or ₹20,025 million). The remaining unallocated proceeds (₹2,801.30 cr or 34.97% of fresh issue) will go towards GCP and Inorganic Growth combined. |
Watch | Objects of the Offer, p.144 | ||||||||||
| 36 |
Geographic concentration of revenue
Where to find: 'Our Business'
Why it matters: Dependence on one region or country.
Benchmark: One geography dominant = flag
|
100% of revenue is within India. Operations are concentrated in high-density urban areas/metro cities (Mumbai, Bengaluru, Delhi NCR, Hyderabad, Chennai, Pune, Kolkata), representing geographic concentration. |
Watch | Notes to Restated Financials, Note 18, p.377 | ||||||||||
| 42 |
Entry barriers / moat - real or weak?
Where to find: Strengths, Competition
Why it matters: Whether good returns can be sustained.
Benchmark: Low barriers = flag
|
Moat is moderate: scale, network density, last-mile efficiency, and brand. However, entry barriers are low as new players (Amazon Now, Flipkart Minutes) are entering, making it highly competitive. |
Watch | Our Business, p.251, 255 | ||||||||||
| 44 |
Technology / obsolescence risk
Where to find: Risk Factors
Why it matters: Exposure to disruption.
Benchmark: -
|
High dependency on proprietary technology (WMS, routing engine, app). Technology disruptions represent operational risks. |
Watch | Risk Factors, p.49, 57 | ||||||||||
| 48 |
EBITDA and EBITDA-margin trend
Where to find: Financials
Why it matters: Core operating profitability.
Benchmark: -
|
Operating EBITDA: FY24 -₹1,118.82 cr (-25.1% margin) → FY25 -₹4,589.34 cr (-41.3%) → FY26 -₹5,244.12 cr (-23.2%). EBITDA losses increased in absolute terms but improved in margin terms in FY26.
|
Watch | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 50 |
PAT and PAT-margin trend
Where to find: Financials
Why it matters: The bottom line and its direction.
Benchmark: -
|
PAT: FY24 -₹1,214.79 cr (-27.3% margin) → FY25 -₹4,699.71 cr (-42.3%) → FY26 -₹5,905.19 cr (-26.1%). PAT losses increased in absolute terms but improved in margin terms in FY26.
|
Watch | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 51 |
Other income as % of PAT
Where to find: P&L and notes
Why it matters: Tests whether profit is operating or propped up by 'other income'.
Benchmark: High other-income share = flag
|
Other Income: FY26 ₹504.79 cr (equivalent to -8.5% of PAT loss of -₹5,905.19 cr). Propped up by interest income on bank deposits and mutual fund gains. |
Watch | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 52 |
CFO (operating cash flow) trend
Where to find: Cash flow statement
Why it matters: The cash reality behind reported profit.
Benchmark: -
|
CFO: FY24 -₹1,097.88 cr → FY25 -₹4,624.83 cr → FY26 -₹3,462.44 cr. Cash outflows decreased in FY26 due to improved working capital management, but remain deeply negative.
|
Flag | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Cash Flows, p.334 | ||||||||||
| 53 |
CFO / PAT (cash conversion), multi-year
Where to find: CFO divided by PAT
Why it matters: THE single best earnings-quality test.
Benchmark: Consistently <0.6-0.7 = flag
|
CFO/PAT: FY24 0.90x → FY25 0.98x → FY26 0.59x. Ratios are based on negative CFO and negative PAT, showing that operating cash loss is less than accounting loss.
|
Watch | Restated Financials, p.75, 334 | ||||||||||
| 54 |
Was CFO negative in any year?
Where to find: Cash flow statement
Why it matters: Operations consuming rather than generating cash.
Benchmark: Any negative CFO year = flag
|
Yes, CFO was negative in all three years (FY26: -₹3,462.44 cr, FY25: -₹4,624.83 cr, FY24: -₹1,097.88 cr).
|
Flag | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Cash Flows, p.334 | ||||||||||
| 55 |
Free cash flow (CFO minus capex)
Where to find: Cash flow statement
Why it matters: Ability to self-fund growth.
Benchmark: Persistently negative FCF = caution
|
FCF: FY24 -₹1,220.54 cr → FY25 -₹5,505.95 cr → FY26 -₹4,131.50 cr. FCF is deeply negative in all three years due to operating cash losses and ongoing dark store fit-out capex.
|
Flag | Restated Financials, Summary Statement of Cash Flows, p.334 | ||||||||||
| 58 |
Interest coverage (EBIT / interest)
Where to find: P&L
Why it matters: Ability to service debt comfortably.
Benchmark: <2-3x = flag
|
Interest Coverage: -23.18x in FY26 (-36.26x in FY25, -21.79x in FY24). Negative due to EBIT losses (EBIT is -₹6,138.37 cr in FY26). |
Flag | Restated Financials, p.75 | ||||||||||
| 59 |
ROE and trend
Where to find: Compute / ratios
Why it matters: Return generated on shareholders' funds.
Benchmark: Low or falling = flag
|
ROE: FY24 -70.7% → FY25 -54.7% → FY26 -98.5%. Negative due to persistent net losses.
|
Flag | Restated Financials, p.71, 75 | ||||||||||
| 60 |
ROCE and trend
Where to find: Compute / ratios
Why it matters: Efficiency of all capital employed.
Benchmark: -
|
ROCE: FY24 -65.6% → FY25 -58.2% → FY26 -102.3%. Negative due to operating losses. (With lease liabilities: FY24 -55.6%, FY25 -46.4%, FY26 -70.5%).
|
Flag | Restated Financials, p.71, 72, 75 | ||||||||||
| 61 |
ROCE vs cost of capital
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Is the business creating or destroying value?
Benchmark: ROCE below ~12-14% = value-destructive
|
ROCE is deeply negative (FY26: -102.34%), well below any positive cost of capital, indicating value destruction due to high operating losses. |
Flag | Restated Financials, p.71, 72, 75 | ||||||||||
| 64 |
Payable days and trend
Where to find: Compute
Why it matters: Supplier financing; abnormal stretching can mask stress.
Benchmark: Abnormal stretch = caution
|
Payable Days (Purchases): FY24 61.30 days → FY25 84.71 days → FY26 73.55 days. Suppliers are stretched to fund the working capital cycle.
|
Watch | Restated Financials, p.71, 75 | ||||||||||
| 67 |
Capex history vs proposed capex
Where to find: Cash flow vs Objects
Why it matters: Execution credibility of the expansion plan.
Benchmark: Proposed >> historical = execution risk
|
Proposed fit-out capex: ₹1,628.98 cr (FY27-FY30) for 1,904 new stores. Historical capex (PPE purchase): FY24 ₹122.66 cr → FY25 ₹881.12 cr → FY26 ₹669.06 cr. Proposed capex is significantly higher, representing execution risk.
|
Watch | Objects of the Offer, p.144 | Cash Flows, p.334 | ||||||||||
| 71 |
Auditor qualifications / emphasis of matter
Where to find: Auditor's report
Why it matters: The auditor's own stated doubts.
Benchmark: Any qualification = flag
|
Qualified opinion on internal controls (IFCoFR) for FY25 and FY26 due to lack of appropriate IT general controls (access and change management). Modifications on books of account regarding audit trail (edit log) features on certain software. |
Flag | Auditor's Report, p.326-327 | ||||||||||
| 77 |
Promoter / KMP remuneration vs PAT and peers
Where to find: 'Management'
Why it matters: Cash extraction relative to profits.
Benchmark: High pay vs PAT = flag
|
FY26 Remuneration: Aadit Palicha ₹2.74 cr, Kaivalya Vohra ₹2.61 cr, Ramesh Bafna ₹3.85 cr. Remuneration is high in absolute terms but small relative to the net loss of ₹5,905.19 cr. |
Watch | Management, p.300 | RPT Note, p.375 | ||||||||||
| 83 |
ESOP / outstanding options - dilution overhang
Where to find: 'Capital Structure'
Why it matters: Future dilution of your stake.
Benchmark: Large unvested pool = caution
|
Outstanding options in force under ESOP 2025 are 1,212,276,973 options, representing 9.62% of pre-offer fully diluted shares. The total ESOP pool is 1,475,434,008 options (~11.71%). Exercise price is ₹0. This represents a significant dilution overhang. |
Watch | Capital Structure, p.139 | ||||||||||
| 84 |
Lock-in: promoter and anchor / pre-IPO investors
Where to find: 'Capital Structure'
Why it matters: Share supply that hits the market post-listing.
Benchmark: Big near-term unlocks = caution
|
Promoters' minimum contribution of 20% locked in for 3 years (or 18 months); all other pre-issue shares (~80% of company) locked in for 1 year from listing. Represents a large potential supply overhang after 1 year. |
Watch | Capital Structure, p.94 | ||||||||||
| 85 |
Past corporate-governance issues / regulatory strictures
Where to find: Risk Factors, Litigation
Why it matters: A pattern of past behaviour.
Benchmark: Any history = flag
|
No past corporate-governance issues or regulatory strictures against promoters. However, active regulatory investigations exist (ED summons requesting information for promoters/directors Aadit Palicha and Kaivalya Vohra). |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.589 | ||||||||||
| 94 |
Criminal cases against promoters / directors
Where to find: 'Outstanding Litigation'
Why it matters: An integrity red flag that can override the numbers.
Benchmark: Any = serious flag
|
One criminal complaint under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 filed by labor inspector against promoter Kaivalya Vohra regarding record-keeping lapses at Karnataka hub. Summoms issued; High Court of Karnataka has stayed the proceedings. Pending. |
Flag | Outstanding Litigation, p.586, 587 | ||||||||||
| 96 |
Direct + indirect tax disputes and amounts
Where to find: 'Outstanding Litigation'
Why it matters: Contingent cash outflows.
Benchmark: Large vs PAT = flag
|
Direct Tax disputes: 8 cases involving ₹46.10 cr (₹460.95 million); Indirect Tax disputes: 11 cases involving ₹55.80 cr (₹557.95 million) for Company and 6 cases involving ₹0.33 cr (₹3.26 million) for Subsidiaries. Total tax claims = ₹102.22 cr. |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.590 | ||||||||||
| 97 |
Regulatory / statutory actions (SEBI, RBI, environmental, labour)
Where to find: 'Outstanding Litigation'
Why it matters: Signals compliance culture.
Benchmark: Active actions = flag
|
Yes, CCPA penalty of ₹0.70 million (₹7 lakh) for dark patterns ('Basket Sneaking' & 'Drip Pricing') against ZMPL (appealed, stayed by NCDRC). Summoms from ED to promoters Aadit Palicha and Kaivalya Vohra requesting information. Food safety cases in Meerut/Pune. |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.582, 588, 590 | ||||||||||
| 98 |
Total quantifiable amount involved
Where to find: Litigation summary
Why it matters: Sizing the aggregate exposure.
Benchmark: -
|
Total quantifiable amount involved in litigation is ₹102.30 cr (₹102.22 cr tax claims + ₹0.08 cr regulatory penalties). |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.582, 590 | ||||||||||
| 100 |
Any case threatening a key licence or the business model?
Where to find: Litigation, Risk Factors
Why it matters: Existential risk to operations.
Benchmark: Yes = serious flag
|
CCPA dark patterns order directed Zepto to ensure discontinuation of dark patterns and conduct regular self-audits. This impacts user retention tactics but does not threaten key licenses. |
Watch | Outstanding Litigation, p.588 | ||||||||||
| 107 |
ROE vs peers
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Does quality justify any premium?
Benchmark: Premium + lower ROE = flag
|
Zepto ROE is -98.5% in FY26. Peers: Swiggy consolidated ROE is -22.7% (due to net loss of ₹2,636 cr); Zomato (Eternal) consolidated ROE is +1.18% (due to net profit of ₹351 cr). Zepto's ROE is significantly lower. |
Flag | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 | ||||||||||
| 108 |
ROCE vs peers
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Capital efficiency relative to price.
Benchmark: -
|
Zepto ROCE is -102.3% in FY26. Peer Zomato (Eternal) ROCE is positive (~1.2% consolidated); Swiggy ROCE is negative. Zepto's ROCE is significantly lower than Zomato's but comparable to Swiggy's. |
Flag | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 | ||||||||||
| 110 |
Margins vs peers
Where to find: Compare
Why it matters: Quality of earnings relative to price.
Benchmark: -
|
Zepto gross margin is 19.6% and EBITDA margin is -23.2% in FY26. Peer Zomato (Eternal) gross margin is ~21% and EBITDA margin ~1.5% (consolidated). Swiggy gross margin is ~18% and EBITDA margin ~-8% (consolidated). |
Watch | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 | ||||||||||
| 112 |
Is the premium justified by ROCE / ROE / growth / margins?
Where to find: Synthesise
Why it matters: The core valuation verdict.
Benchmark: Premium unsupported by quality = flag
|
The premium over WACA cannot be computed yet. However, the premium over asset value (NAV ₹2.95) is likely high, which is justified by Zepto's faster growth (125.4% CAGR) but offset by negative ROCE/ROE and losses. |
Watch | Basis for Offer Price, p.161 | ||||||||||
| 113 |
What growth does the price implicitly assume?
Where to find: Reverse the multiple / judgment
Why it matters: Are the embedded expectations realistic?
Benchmark: Heroic assumptions = flag
|
Consensus assumptions require Zepto to maintain a revenue growth of >50% and achieve EBITDA breakeven within 18-24 months post-IPO to justify a multi-billion dollar valuation. |
Watch | Basis for Offer Price, p.158 | ||||||||||
| 115 |
Any genuine dealbreaker buried in boilerplate?
Where to find: 'Risk Factors'
Why it matters: The serious risks hide among generic ones; find them.
Benchmark: -
|
Yes, active regulatory investigations (ED summons to promoters Aadit Palicha and Kaivalya Vohra requesting information); CCPA dark patterns investigation and ₹0.70 million penalty; and minimum wage criminal complaint against Kaivalya Vohra. |
Flag | Outstanding Litigation, p.586, 588, 590 | ||||||||||
| 117 |
Going-concern or liquidity language anywhere?
Where to find: Risk Factors / Auditor
Why it matters: A direct signal of survival risk.
Benchmark: Any going-concern language = serious flag
|
Going concern note in Annexure V lists losses of ₹5,905.19 cr in FY26 but notes that net current assets are positive at ₹4,330.75 cr and additional equity capital has been raised. No going-concern qualification from auditors. |
Watch | Notes to Restated Financials, Note 1.2, p.338 |